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THE ASSAULT OF RATIONALISM ON THE ACADEMIC SPIRIT 
 
 
Richard G. Berlach 
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Edith Cowan University 
Perth, Western Australia 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The world-wide obsession with rationalistically-based decision-
making processes has resulted in individuals and societies alike 
suffering at the hands of bureaucrats and their masters, federal 
and state politicians. Institutions, industries, and even 
governments are now being seen as organisations to be managed 
by cold reason with little or no account being taken of the human 
spirit or of the attitudes and values of individuals.  It appears that 
human worth and dignity have been replaced by rationalistically-
motivated expediency cloaked in jargon divined by corporate 
management. Sadly, this form of rationality has found its way 
into Australian universities and is detrimentally affecting the 
mission of, and academic culture within, these institutions of 
higher learning. Such reshaping has resulted in most publicly-
funded universities now evolving as businesses rather than 
autonomous centres of learning, research and scholarship.  The 
present work explores the antecedents of rationalism, challenges 
the value of this prevailing ideology, and presents an alternative 
paradigm for maintaining the mission and culture of the 
university. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Australian society is in the throes of experiencing a rationalist hegemony 
implemented by successive Federal and State governments.  Obsession with 
privatisation, corporatisation and efficiency has left social systems in chaos 
in a country where the words unpredictability and uncertainty are on the lips 
of many.  The once ‘‘Lucky Country’’ seems now to be very much down on 
its luck. 
 
Universities have not remained unscathed by this prevailing political 
ideology.  Like other organisations, they too have been swallowed into the 
vortex of economic rationalism, with most not only capitulating to but 
wholeheartedly embracing, a worldview in which the functions of 
management take precedence over academic matters.  One result has been 
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that university academics can no longer say ‘‘we are the university’’ (i.e. the 
academy of scholars), as has been the university tradition for centuries but 
rather, are now forced to affirm ‘‘we work for the university’’ (i.e. in a master-
servant relationship).  Such a reorientation has struck at the very core of 
what university life and academic freedom are about. 
 
The new order has radically redefined the task and life of the university.  As 
significant decisions are now being made on rationalistic rather than 
educational grounds, academics have suffered the erosion of autonomy for 
it is no longer teaching, research and scholarship which hold pre-eminence.  
Consequently, considerations such as course availability, capital 
improvement, staff employment conditions, availability of resources, and 
academic promotion, are routinely no longer determined by educational 
need, justice, principle or desirability, but by whether or not potential 
changes are cost effective and produce the type of efficiencies which are of 
benefit to the university corporation (Coady, 2000).  In other words, 
university managers no longer ask ‘is this educationally desirable’ but 
rather, ‘is this sound business practice?’. 
 
Such a climate has lead to academics becoming dispirited, demoralised, 
frustrated, intimidated by management, and fearful of job loss.  With the 
ostensible removal of academic freedom, many individuals have accepted 
redundancies or simply walked away.  This has lead to a reduction in the 
number and quality of Australian academics - as regularly attested to in 
national newspapers.  As a result, subject offerings have shrunk with a 
commensurate impact on program diversity.  With fewer full-time 
academics to advise them, students have often been left confused and the 
burgeoning part-time lecturing contingent, which has little or no knowledge 
of the intricacies of the system, has done little to alleviate this situation.  
Coupled with this, a weak student union (in Western Australia at least, 
since the passing of legislation banning compulsory unionism in the middle 
1990s), is powerless to help them.  In fact, some student unions now rely 
heavily on university funding for their very existence.  In such an 
environment, student union autonomy is an ideal of a bygone era. 
 
Australian universities seem to be in the midst of an identity crisis.  
Whereas in previous eras universities have operated within a liberal-
democratic environment, today’s rationalistically motivated and so 
rationalistically funded government agenda has meant that universities 
have been forced to scramble to redefine themselves.  Such redefinition, 
however, has amounted to little more than capitulating to the prevailing 
Zeitgeist.  Little thought has been given to the detrimental effects of 
rationalism on university life, mission and culture and so, its pre-eminence 
continues to thrive unchallenged.  Rationalism thus enjoys the status of a fait 
accompli. Carolyn Allport, president of the National Tertiary Education 
Union, was poignant in stating that "universities, whether public or private, 
exist for the public interest.  Their Acts of Incorporation are clear on this 
front" (p. 2).  Given such a charter, they are now, "under the influence of 
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economic rationalism, in danger of being turned into a mere auxiliary of the 
international market and monetary system" (Self, 1995, p.341) 
 
 
RATIONALITY - ITS HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 
 
In terms of its etymology, rationality is grounded in reasoned thinking (L. 
rationalis = reason).  A rational approach to understanding does not 
discount other forms of knowing, it does however, insist that rationally 
motivated arguments must be subjected to the rules governing reason, logic 
and objectivity.  Rationality has accurately been described as ‘‘the ability 
and inclination to look for reasons - it is an essential feature of one who is 
capable of seeing the world right, of discovering truth, or of recognizing 
when one line of argument is better than, one way of life is preferable to, 
another’’ (Parker, 1997, p. 43).  Rationality is first of all reasonable, then 
methodologically defensible, and finally unbiased.  As such, it is opposed to 
‘‘the universalism and naked instrumentalism of positivism on the one hand 
and subjectivism or arbitrariness on the other’’ (Parker, 1997, p. 49). 
 
The potency of the rational mind in seeking to understand the world has a 
long heritage.  The concept in the West can perhaps be traced back to the 
Classical Greek period.  Aristotle, who may represent the apogee of Greek 
rational thought, is best remembered as the great classifier, orderer, and 
systematiser of knowledge.  For Aristotle, according to Mayer (1973), 
‘‘man’s most important attribute is his rational capacity.....’’ in that 
‘‘.....reason can understand the totality of life; it can give order to chaos’’ (pp. 
106, 108).  In this, Aristotle stood in contrast to Plato who did not consider 
the emotional life as merely ‘‘a prelude to our rational development’’ 
(Mayer, p. 106), but as having at least as much existential value as 
rationality itself.  Some have argued, however, that a thinking/feeling 
dichotomy in Hellenistic thought is a recent Western aberration and that 
Greek thinkers did not see the head and the heart as being autonomous but 
rather, as operating in synchrony.  The eighteenth century German literary 
writer Friedrich Schiller (2001), for example, advanced the view that for the 
Greeks, reason was never seen as independent but existed in harmony with 
feeling.  This harmony, according to Schiller, resided in the fact that the 
Greeks did not see themselves as free individuals in the sense that their 
conscience was independent of the views of the community.  In Schiller’s 
view, reason for the Greeks was tempered by what may be today referred to 
as a humanistic orientation. 
 
Despite the debate over head-heart polarisation, writers such as Schaeffer 
(1975) have argued that all Classical Greek thinkers had three important 
principles in common; 
 
The first is that they were rationalistic.  By this is meant that man 
begins absolutely and totally from himself, gathers information 
concerning the particulars, and formulates the universals..... Second, 
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they all believed in the rational.  This word has no relationship to the 
word ‘rationalism’.  They acted upon the basis that man’s aspiration 
for the validity of reason was well founded.  They thought in terms 
of antithesis.  If a certain thing was right, the opposite was wrong.....  
The third thing that men had always hoped for in philosophy was 
that they would be able to construct a unified field of knowledge.....  
They hoped that by means of rationalism plus rationality they would 
find a complete answer - an answer that would encompass all of 
thought and all of life.   
       (pp. 34-35, italics added) 
 
Hellenistic rationality persevered in powerful ways throughout subsequent 
eras with little change taking place until the thirteenth century when 
Thomas Aquinas, ‘‘the great rationalizer of the Catholic faith’’ (cited in 
Ulich, 1971, p. 62), produced his famous five proofs for the existence of God.  
Aquinas is remembered for using a purely rational approach, insisting that 
reason ‘‘is the only thing that constitutes us men and distinguishes us from 
brutes’’ (in Ulich, 1971, p. 313).  Pure reason was gaining ascendency over 
humanistic concerns, and the stable platform which had supported Aristotle 
and Plato for some 1600 years, was beginning to develop serious fissures.   
 
It was probably the sixteenth century event known as the Reformation, which 
gave reason exponential rise over its ailing antagonist.  Vesey and Foulkes 
(1990) suggested that ‘‘The main effect of the Reformation was to undermine 
the spirit of obedience to any clerical authority, which paved the way for the 
development of modern science and philosophy.  Thus the humanist efforts 
of the Renaissance were able to grow into a permanently secular movement 
of intellectual enquiry, which has lasted ever since’’ (pp. 250-251).  The 
Reformation, together with its historical sibling the Renaissance, became 
huge levers which prised open the harmony previously existing between 
reason and feeling.  Reason had now not only become autonomous but was 
‘‘held to be the solitary font of knowledge, while the whole idea of spiritual 
meaning in the universe was cast aside like a wornout garment’’ (Burns, 
1958, p. 520).  Aristotle and Plato were no longer speaking to each other.  
The result?  Philosophies of a purely rationalistic view of life began to 
abound.   
 
Rationalism was further advanced by ‘‘the great 17th-century 
metaphysicians Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, who believed that the 
general nature of the world could be established by wholly non-empirical 
demonstrative reasoning’’ (Bullock, Strallybrass, & Trombley, 1988, p. 721).  
Rationality was becoming increasingly more arrogant and self-assured, and 
even more detached from emotion. 
 
The eighteenth century produced Rousseau, who insisted that there existed 
in every child, as exemplified by Emile, (Rousseau, 1759/1911) a ‘noble 
savage’ who had been corrupted by the process of enculturation, but who 
could be redeemed by being encouraged to make ‘‘the best use of his 
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reason’’ (Rousseau, in Ulich, 1971, p. 425).  Rousseau’s contemporary, 
Emmanual Kant in Critique of pure reason (1781/1934) and Religion 
within the limits of reason alone (1793/1960) showed a clear epistemological 
disposition in favour of pure reason, suggesting that there existed in human 
nature an irreconcilable split, even in the rationale of ethics, between reason 
and other forms of knowing. 
 
Rationality’s position was strengthened in the nineteenth century through 
the rise of Hegalianism with its emphasis on reason and individuality.  
Hegel (1837/1953) as an idealist, saw the breakdown of Schiller’s harmony 
between reason and feeling as being developmentally necessary for the 
detachment of the individual conscience from its immediate community.  
For Hegel (2001), the real was rational and the rational real.  Such a position 
asserts that ‘‘the citizens of Hegel's organic community do not obey its laws 
and customs simply because they are there. With the independence of mind 
characteristic of modern times, they can only give their allegiance to 
institutions that they recognise as conforming to rational principles. The 
modern organic state, unlike the ancient Greek city-state, is self-consciously 
based on rationally selected principles’’.  It was also Hegel who 
reinvigorated interest in the Greek concept of the ‘‘speculative unity of all 
knowledge’’ (Appignanesi & Garratt, 1995. p. 105), believing that the 
scientific method had the power to one day explain and unite physical and 
metaphysical reality. 
 
With the arrival of the twentieth century, the divide between objective 
reason and emotion became irreconcilable.  Reason was now free, absolutely 
free from the constraints of emotion.  Whereas in the past, according to 
writers such as the previously cited Schiller, Ancient Greek moral 
consciousness did not make the modern distinction between morality and 
self-interest, Modernist and Postmodernist thinkers now felt freed to do 
precisely that.  The path forward for the human race would now be 
determined by reason alone, without regard to moral consciousness.   
 
The rationalist imprimatur is clearly evident in the work of twentieth 
century philosophers such as Bertrand Russell (1961) in the area of religion 
vis-a-vis science; Karl Popper (1934/1959) in the form of critical and science-
based rationalism; in the logical positivism of A. J. Ayer (1951, 1959); and in 
the atheistic existentialism of Sartre (1972).  In psychology, the behaviourist 
B.F. Skinner (1971) had much to say about the type of determinism which 
found its roots in the waters of autonomous reason.  The humanistically 
oriented Carl Rogers (1961) likewise appealed to reason for answers when 
he wrote; 
 
 I have little sympathy with the rather prevalent concept that man is 
basically irrational, and that his impulses, if not controlled, will lead 
to the destruction of others and self.  Man’s behavior is exquisitely 
rational, moving with subtle and ordered complexity toward the 
goals his organism is endeavouring to achieve.  (p. 194) 
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In the realm of twentieth century economic theory, the rationalist 
worldview became visible in the assembly-line technology of Henry Ford 
(Morgan, 1996); the bureaucratic organisation identified by Max Weber 
(1947a,b); the scientific management of Frederick Taylor (1947); the 
monetarist views espoused by Milton Friedman (1962); and ultimately, in 
the ‘‘McDonaldisation’’ (Kolb, Osland, & Rubin, 1995a) of much of the 
corporate sector.  Such thinking emphasises, among other factors, a free 
market economy, objectively measurable productivity gains, a mean-and-
lean workforce, and highly honed efficiency indicators as the key criteria of 
success and value (Haynes, 1997).   
 
The twentieth century, and especially the latter half, witnessed a redefined 
rationalism being used as the vehicle for transporting a crass form of 
capitalism to the masses.  In essence, authoritarian management had been 
harnessed in the service of capitalistic gain, with this new rationalism 
providing the necessary ideology. Chomsky (1996) showed perspicacity in 
understanding this when he wrote: 
 
As state capitalism developed into the modem era, economic, 
political and ideological systems have increasingly been taken 
over by vast institutions of private tyranny that are about as close 
to the totalitarian ideal as any that humans have so far con- 
structed. ‘Within the corporation’, political economist Robert 
Brady wrote a half century  ago, ‘all policies emanate from the 
control above. In the union of this power to determine policy with 
the execution thereof, all authority necessarily proceeds from the top 
to the bottom and all responsibility from the bottom to the top. This 
is, of course, the inverse of ‘‘democratic’’ control; it follows the 
structural conditions of dictatorial power. What in political circles 
would be called legislative, executive, and judicial powers' is 
gathered in 'controlling hands' which, 'so far as policy formulation 
and execution are concerned, are found at the peak of the pyramid 
and are manipulated without significant check from its base'.  As 
private power 'grows and expands', it is transformed ‘into a 
community force ever more politically potent and politically 
conscious', ever more dedicated to a 'propaganda program' that 
'becomes a matter of converting the public ... to the point of view of 
the control pyramid’. 
(p. 71-72) 
 
In summary, the assumptions and values underpinning rationalism have 
changed over the past two and a half thousand years.  Ideals have taken 
root which, to borrow from Husserl, ‘‘retain the word but not the task’’ 
(1970, p. 15).  The shift has occurred in three main areas - ontology, 
epistemology, and sociology.  First, the rise of humanism removed God’s 
ontological necessity, thus paving the way for an autonomous humanity.  
Second the epistemological relationship between thinking and emotion 
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changed, with the former gaining ascendancy over the latter.  Finally, with 
the shift from an agrarian to an industrialised and later a technocratic 
society, the notion of human relationship was replaced by one of human 
capital.  These factors in combination, yielded fertile ground in which the 
seeds of a reinterpreted rationality, along economic lines, could be brought 
to full maturity. 
 
Philosophical rationalism, then, originally a method for acquiring 
knowledge of metaphysical realities by using faculties that transcended 
purely empirical experience, had been hijacked.  A genuine rationalism had 
been replaced by a naïve form which can perhaps be described as 
irrationalism, and entangled with a nescient form of capitalism where the 
‘bottom line’ for measuring worth and value had become monetary gain.  
The ideological ideal known as economic rationalism was born - an ideal 
under which Australian universities are currently labouring. 
 
 
THE RISE & RISE OF ECONOMIC RATIONALISM 
 
At its best, economic rationalist thinking embodies a strong commitment to 
empirical investigation which leads to reasonable benefits for all members 
of society.  By economic means, rationalists strive for such ends as the 
absence of global conflict; the efficient management of the world’s 
resources; the development of effective ways of meeting human needs; and 
the creation of workforce accountability.  The mind which creates, however, 
is the same mind which can destroy.  At its worst, economic rationalists 
place financial considerations ahead of any other concerns and so deny 
‘‘Adam Smith’s recognition of moral bonds and altruism’’ (Marginson, 1997, 
p. 103).  The result is a system in which market forces are allowed to operate 
in ways which advantage society’s fiscally powerful and elite citizens.  
Concomitantly, human individuality is dispassionately bleached out in 
favour of mass conformity; established structures and systems are 
obliterated to destroy any memory of more humane regimes; institutional 
heritage is seen as possessing little value; the existing culture of 
relationships is destroyed with a chilling sense of detachment; and 
Machiavellian strategies are enthusiastically endorsed for dealing with 
ideological dissidents. This rational hegemony gives little or no thought to 
the worth, value, desires, preferences or predispositions of those being 
affected by its economically-driven agenda.  This is Weber’s notion of 
‘rational capitalism’ taken to the extreme and regrettably, is the type of 
rationalism which appears to be evident in the majority of Australian 
universities. 
 
Rudyard Kipling once defined jingoism as ‘‘patriotism gone mad’’.  At the 
risk of personifying the term, excessive economic rationalism could well be 
defined as ‘‘rationality gone mad’’.  Excessive rationalism is essentially the 
ideological deification of reason.  It consists of taking a leap from seeing all 
knowledge of the world as being based on reason, ‘‘to the view that the 
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world is itself constructed on rational lines; that is, in ways that belong to 
reason’’.  This leads to the belief that ‘‘the world is reducible to simple 
elements, from which everything can be constructed by logic alone’’ (Vesey 
& Foulkes, 1990, p. 248).  Such a conviction is then harnessed in the service 
of justifying any action which aids an economically motivated endeavour. 
 
Mitchell, Scott, and Nielsen (1995) have argued that such an approach is 
disastrous economically because its ‘‘values are 1) a present versus a future 
orientation, 2) an instrumental as opposed to a substantive focus, and 3) an 
emphasis on individualism contrasted with community’’ (pp. 145-46).  
Immediate gratification, pure instrumentality and rampant individualism, 
argued the writers, spell eventual unsustainability for any economic system. 
If these writers are correct, then economic rationalism has only limited 
longevity but the potential to cause great institutional and personal harm 
during its tenure. 
 
Noll (1994) has shown how the rationalist agenda of programmed success is 
an assault on the human spirit in that it denies the complexities which make 
us human by reducing every action to a cause and effect relationship.  
Marginson (1997) has sounded his agreement, stating that the individual is 
given the commodity status of  ‘‘human capital’’, ‘‘human resource’’, 
‘‘economic citizen’’, or ‘‘economic unit’’.  The term labour is replaced with 
product - the emphasis changing from the creator to what is being created.  
Such an approach strikes at the very core of what it means to be human.   As 
such, a predetermined economic purpose will never fill the existential void 
created by loss of significance, the breakdown of relationships, or 
destruction of personal meaning.   
 
George Soros (1998), corporate magnate turned humanitarian, arrived at 
similar conclusions to those expressed above.  After reviewing theorists 
such as John Maynard Keynes and Milton Friedman in relation to the 
making of rational market predictions, Soros concluded that ‘‘there is a 
prevailing belief that economic affairs are subject to irresistible natural laws 
comparable to the laws of physics.  This belief is false’’ (p. 28).  Soros argued 
that although a distinction needed to be made between thinking and reality 
in order to have rational thought, the two must never be separated or the 
balance between the two be allowed to become skewed.  If this happens, 
human fallibility will lead on one hand to cold rationality where the 
participant becomes less important than the thinking, or on the other, to a 
reality which is clouded and deluded.  Current economic thinking, 
concluded Soros, venerates right thinking but ignores the agents of that 
thinking.  This is disastrous, because what is valued in a society becomes 
distorted.  One always needs to remember that; 
 
.....economic behavior is only one kind of behavior and the values 
that economic theory takes as given are not the only kind of values 
that prevail in society.....  The scope and influence of economic theory 
has expanded beyond the confines that the postulates of an axiomatic 
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system ought to impose.  Market fundamentalists have transformed 
an axiomatic, value-neutral theory into an ideology, which has 
influenced political and business behavior in a powerful and 
dangerous way. 
           (Soros, 1998, pp. 45, 43)     
 
What apologists for economic rationalism fail to realise is ‘‘the narrowness 
of the range within which reason is applicable, or its propensity for self-
contradiction, or its manifest inability to solve most of the fundamental 
questions about experience’’ (Magee, 1997, p. 16).  An environment which 
denies that human beings are anything more than homo economicus 
(Buchanan & Tullock, 1965) becomes ultimately soul destroying.  Schaeffer’s 
words written in the mid 1970s are even more pressing at the dawning of a 
new millennium, namely, that ‘‘we are watching our culture put into effect 
the fact that, when you tell men long enough that they are machines, it soon 
begins to show in their actions’’ (1975. p. 39).  One would do well to keep in 
mind the injunction of Soros (1998), that economically motivated decisions 
have social, emotional, and spiritual, as well as rational consequences. As 
such, economic rationalism is ultimately self-defeating because efficiency-
driven productivity will fall as individuals feel more-and-more dispirited, 
marginalised, devalued and powerless. 
 
Perhaps the most damming diatribe on excessive rationalism in recent years 
has come from the pen of John Ralston Saul (1993) in his book Voltaire’s 
Bastards: The dictatorship of reason in the West.  Saul demolishes the religious-
like axioms upon which rationalism has been founded and calls for a return 
to individual participation in the identification and creation of values.  
Lambkin (1998) has undertaken an extensive critique of Saul’s major works 
and prepared a summary which identifies the essential qualities of  
corporatist rationalism as identified by Saul.  An illuminating exercise is to 
compare Lambkin’s summary with insights gleaned from organisational 
psychology.  David Kolb, together with his associates, has established 
himself as one of the foremost authorities on organisational behaviour.  His 
research and writings on ‘best-practice’ in the business world are 
mandatory reading in many university Business schools.  A comparison of 
the two columns presented in Table 1 indicates that rationalism's answer to 
organisational management is in diametrical opposition to the 
organisational principles espoused by one of the world’s leading 
organisational theorists. 
 
The qualities of Saul’s corporate rationalism with responses distilled from 
sources found in Kolb. 
 
QUALITIES OF CORPORATE 
RATIONALISM AS IDENTIFIED BY SAUL* 
 
 
EXPERTS’ RESPONSES  
FOUND IN KOLB** 
1. The ascendancy of reason as a moral 
weapon with the inevitable conclusion that 
the solution to  problems lie in the 
determined application of rationally 
Other factors such as personality, 
environment, culture, education, grouping, 
affect, will also determine the effectiveness 
and ultimate desirability of solutions. 
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organised expertise. (Kolb, 1995a, p 382, 354-6) 
2. The marginalization of the human 
qualities - spirit, common sense, doubt, 
perception, faith, emotion, intuition, 
experience; and a denial of our most 
important instincts - the democratic, the 
practical, the imaginative. 
 
Once the ‘‘psychological contract’’ between 
employer and employee has been violated, 
more emphasis will be placed by the 
employee on obtaining personal satisfaction 
in out-of-work activities, situations, and 
relationships. 
(Kolb, 1995a, pp.7-10) 
3. An obsession with certainty, with 
absolute answers, with simplification 
(where in reality there is great complexity), 
and with the need to remove uncertainty, 
through rational procedures. 
‘‘The process of problem solving does not 
proceed in a logical, linear fashion from 
beginning..... it is not the result of a single 
mental function such as logical thinking’’. 
(Kolb, 1995a, p. 249) 
4. A fixation with, and servility to intricate 
structure, systems and processes which are 
developed through the application of a 
clean, unemotional logic. 
 
‘Master managers’ transcend the rules of 
mechanistic logic and adopt a more 
comprehensive and flexible logic. 
‘‘Structure is not organisation’’ 
(Kolb, 1995b, pp. 48, 578-589) 
5. The denial of history - successive absolute 
answers are provided for major public 
problems without reference to previous 
experience. 
 
Old-timers-in-the-know are what give a 
business or an institution a sense of history 
and prevent it from repeating errors of the 
past. 
(Kolb, 1995a, p. 72) 
6. The creation in the individual of passivity 
and conformity in those areas which matter, 
and non-conformity in those which don’t. 
 
‘‘every manager must motivate and 
encourage his employees, somehow 
reconciling their individual needs with the 
goals of the organization.’’ 
(Kolb, 1995b, p. 37) 
 
7. An obsession with efficiency and 
productivity as values in themselves. 
 
Efficiency and productivity without 
consideration of human relationships  has the 
potential of leading to an ‘‘oppressive sweat 
shop’’ mentality. 
(Kolb, 1995b, pp. 50-53) 
8. A fixation with specialist knowledge and 
expertise, and with arcane technical dialects 
which split the language into a public and a 
corporatist domain.  It therefore becomes 
difficult for anyone, either insider or 
outsider, to grasp reality. 
‘‘reverential and utopian’’ ideologies, with 
associated ‘‘near mystical terminology’’, do 
not provide a framework for action. 
Goals must be communicated in clear and 
meaningful ways. 
(Kolb, 1995b, pp. 97, 398) 
 
9. A fixation with management, and an 
obsession among the corporatist elites with 
structure, systems, processes and expertise. 
 
‘‘A major reason for Japan’s famous 
‘economic miracle’ has been its recognition 
that its chief resource - almost its only 
resource - is its people’’ 
(Kolb, 1995a, pp 23; 496) 
 
10. A fixation on qualification, measurement 
and planning. 
 
The search for ‘‘simple, quantifiable 
standards’’ against which to measure and 
reward performance invariably ‘‘cause goal 
displacement’’. 
(Kolb 1995b, p. 558) 
11. An obsession with haste (in reality as a 
means of control and power) - problems 
need solving through efficiently rational 
processes, without the need for considered 
reflection by groups at large. 
Gathering as many perspectives as possible 
about a situation is extremely important as 
there is never one best perspective from 
which to see. 
(Kolb, 1995a, p. 37) 
 
* Distilled from Saul (1993, 1997a, 1997b) by Lambkin (1998, pp. 6-7), and                                                                       
 adapted here. 
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** As envisaged by a variety of experts in Kolb et al. (1995a,b). 
 
Over the past decade especially, organisational and business psychologists 
have contributed much to developing an understanding of the tenuous 
relationship which exists between systems, structures, and people (see for 
example  Funnell, 1995; Isaksson et al., 2000; Lauder, et al., 1999).  In the 
main, advocates of rationalism have, understandably, chosen to either 
ignore or completely disregard such insights.  University administrators are 
no exception.  Consequently, the assualt of rationalism on the university 
sector has occurred on several major fronts, six of which are explored in the 
next section.   
 
 
RATIONALISM AND ITS EFFECTS ON UNIVERSITY LIFE 
 
It is well known that people don’t like change.  University administrators, 
aware of this fact, attempt to soften the blow by making reference to 
‘‘necessary initiatives’’.  Unfortunately, such a phrase is a misnomer as 
many of the changes are neither necessary nor innovative (a quality implied 
by the term initiative).  There appear to be six key areas being targeted by 
rationalist administrators.  These strike at the very heart of university life 
and endanger its mission. 
 
 
‘Initiative’ One:  Centre rather than Circumference 
 
The adoption of the industrial model with its hierarchy of corporate 
managers sourced from private companies has replaced the educational one 
in which managerial tasks were assigned to senior academics.  The agenda, 
then, is to run the university like a corporation rather than an institution of 
higher learning.  As such, huge sums of money have been poured into 
developing a corporate upper echelon (‘the centre’) with an impressive 
sounding structure, whereas the true functions of the university - teaching, 
research and scholarship - receive proportionately less funding.  
 
There is no doubt that over the last decade or so, successive governments 
have made severe cuts to education budgets.  In a context of declining 
resources universities, of necessity, have had to make adjustments.  Harrold 
(2000) reported that in the late1970s government spending on education was 
6.5% of Gross Domestic Product, whereas today it is around 4%.  Such a 
comparison finds support in available statistics from the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (Figure 1, below): 
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Figure 1.  Correlation between tax and public spending on education, 1999. 
 
 
Along similar lines, Marginson (1997) under the subheading Economising 
Education,  makes the observation that ‘‘overall, between 1975-76 and 1992-
93 the ratio of government consumption expenditure to load fell by over 
one-third, dramatically weakening the public contribution to teaching and 
research’’ (p. 220, see Table 2). 
 
Table 2  
Government final consumption expenditure on higher education compared 
to student load, 1975-1993, 1975-1976 = 100.0 
 
 
Period 
Government 
final 
consumption 
expenditure 
Student load 
(average over 
financial year) 
Ratio of 
expenditure to 
student load 
1975-76 100.00 100.00 100.00 
1979-80 106.24 109.13 97.4 
1980-81 108.01 109.83 98.3 
1981-82 110.65 111.18 99.5 
1982-83 109.10 112.15 97.3 
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1983-84 109.04 114.13 95.5 
1984-85 108.41 117.83 92.0 
1985-86 113.97 123.33 92.4 
1986-87 112.59 129.67 86.8 
1987-88 113.85 138.20 82.4 
1989-90 119.86 160.29 74.8 
1990-91 106.73 176.35 60.5 
1991-92 114.48 188.78 60.6 
1992-93 122.40 194.36 63.0 
 
Marginson, 1997, p. 220 (sourced from ABS, CTEC, and DEET data) 
 
 
Marginson’s data highlights the fiscal plight of universities which,  
understandably, have had to respond to government policy by invoking 
cost-cutting measures.  In such a climate, one would expect available 
funding to be apportioned in a way which reduces bureaucracy and so 
protects existing educational programs.  Unfortunately, this has not been 
the case.  OECD Indicators for 1998 report a telling table under the heading  
Educational Expenditure on Tertiary Education (p. 130 Table B5.1 b).  Of the 
available statistics for 17 participating countries, Australia is second lowest 
in terms of compensation for lecturers (29%), but highest in terms of 
compensation for other staff (40%); yet expenditure per student relative to 
GDP is more than for any other country, bar one (see also p. 31).  In other 
words, comparative government expenditure on tertiary education is 
relatively high, but Australian universities spend more on administration 
and less on academic staffing than any other OECD country, bar one.   
 
Such grossly disproportionate expenditure within the universities suggests 
that these institutions are in the process of metamorphosing into self-
serving bureaucracies rather than remaining true to their charter as centres 
of teaching, research and scholarship.  As such, decisions made on purely 
rationalistic grounds, although appealing, have had, are having, and will 
continue to have dire consequences for the mission of the university. 
Much of the available funding goes into supporting and further developing 
the central bureaucracy, while more-and-more is siphoned from teaching 
and research.  It seems that, like a parasite, the central bureaucracy must 
survive, and does so by feeding off three necessary but nevertheless 
inconvenient hosts - teaching, research and scholarship. 
 
 
‘Initiative’ Two:  Publications rather than Pedagogy 
 
The catch-cry ‘‘publish or perish’’ has been a precept defining academic life 
within the modern university.  In recent years, however, the balance 
between research, teaching and scholarship has become severely distorted.  
This has occurred because of the rationalist obsession with control, 
quantification, and efficiency - ‘number of publications’ lends itself much 
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more readily to such scrutiny than ‘quality of teaching’ or ‘level of 
scholarship’.  Such an emphasis, however, has lead to two undesirable 
ramifications.  First, is ‘‘..... the mindless pursuit of publications for its own 
sake that bedevils the modern university’’ (Noll, 1994, p. 30).  Academics 
have been forced into the situation of publishing anything and everything in 
order to have it registered as a publication.  Quantity has in many cases 
replaced quality, for after all, it is quantity that is reported to government 
by university statisticians.   
 
The second undesirable manifestation of the obsession with publications is 
the effect on university pedagogy.  The situation has been well documented 
by Kerr (1995) who wrote: 
 
Society hopes that teachers will not neglect their teaching 
responsibilities but rewards them almost entirely for research and 
publications..... Rewards for good teaching usually are limited to 
outstanding teacher awards, which are given to only a small 
percentage of good teachers and which usually bestow little money 
and fleeting prestige.  Punishments for poor teaching also are rare.  
Rewards for research and publications, on the other hand, and 
punishments for failure to accomplish these, are commonly 
administered by universities at which teachers are employed.  
Furthermore, publication-oriented resumes usually will be well 
received at other universities, whereas teaching credentials, harder to 
document and quantify, are much less transferable.  Consequently it 
is rational for university teachers to concentrate on research, even if 
to the detriment of teaching and at the expense of their students.           
                 (p. 551, bolding added) 
 
If a third obsession were to be identified, it would be the development of a 
new category of university worker, namely the academic entrepreneur.   
Individuals within this category are a valued commodity as they bring 
funds and therefore prestige to the university.  Their modus operandi is to 
buy out as much teaching time as possible, so being able to concentrate on 
vying for grants (preferably large ones), researching, publishing, and being 
rewarded through the university research points incentive scheme.   These 
individuals play the game well, for they have realised that the three big Ps - 
Prestige, Promotion, and Productivity - are measured in terms of research 
output and grant acquisition.  So, how desirable and valuable is teaching 
when those who receive the greatest rewards have off-loaded as much of it 
as possible? 
 
 
‘Initiative’ Three:  Accountants rather than Academics 
 
Universities are now committed to business value rather than academic 
virtue.  In the past senior academics held key administrative positions.  This 
meant that administrators, who had worked their way up from grass roots 
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level, knew how the system functioned, what were its sensitivities, and 
what would and wouldn’t work.  Their agenda was to improve the teaching 
and learning which went on in the university.  Individuals in these positions 
were normally well qualified, experienced, loyal, had a sense of the history 
of the institution, and possessed a high level of commitment.   
 
By contrast, many of today’s senior administrators are recruited from the 
business world.  As such, they are novices to how tertiary institutions 
function and are more at home making decisions along corporate business 
rather educational lines.  They are less well qualified, far less experienced, 
have little or no sense of continuity or traditions of the institution, and will 
leave at the drop of a hat to go to a higher paying position should one 
present itself.  It is not that such individuals are necessarily more desirable 
than those previously promoted from the academic arena, it is simply that 
they cost less, can be disposed of at any time, and are prepared to make 
decisions on the basis of the ‘bottom line’ - and that fits in admirably with 
the rationalistic agenda. 
 
In a comprehensive study, Kolb, Osland and Rubin (1995a) compared 
‘‘mechanistic’’ with ‘‘organic’’ work environments (p. 496).  Their 
investigations revealed that the mechanistic type of environment is 
characterised by McDonaldisation, which emphasises the importance of a 
rationalistically developed structure, which although efficient, yielded low 
job security, high staff turnover, and low job satisfaction.  The organic type 
of environment, by contrast, which was likewise effective, is characterised 
by Matsushitaisation (after Matsushi, a successful but non-rationalistically 
driven Japanese corporation), which stresses function and is spiritualistic in 
nature - characterised by high job security, low staff turnover, and high job 
satisfaction.  With their unprecedented emphasis on developing rationalistic 
corporate structures, Australian institutions of higher learning are in danger 
of becoming ‘‘McVersities’’ (Kolb, Osland, & Rubin, 1995a). 
 
In this new age, the characteristics of expertise, loyalty, and commitment are 
not valued by universities to the same degree as in the past.  The new 
broom of rationalism must sweep away all in its path so that no semblance 
of the old remains.  ‘Old ways’ of doing things must go and the ‘old guard’ 
must be removed.  What rationalism fears above all else is any remnant of 
the past - any evidence which suggests that there have been different ways 
of doing things, of perceiving the world, of understanding reality.  As long 
as money is saved (usually from the teaching program) and productivity 
gains can be shown to have occurred (at least in prospect - audits are rarely 
undertaken), then the corporation considers itself to be healthy.  
Unfortunately, what such a rationalist agenda fails to realise, is that a vast 
amount of recent research has shown that it is ultimately the spiritualistic 
type of environment which produces greatest productivity gains and this 
occurs primarily because staff have a sense of commitment to, and 
ownership of, the organisation (Korten, 1995; Scott, 2000; Pusey, 1991, 1993; 
Smith & Wexler, 1995). 
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‘Initiative’ Four:  Pain rather than Pleasure 
 
In the past, morale, camaraderie, appreciation of and commitment to 
academic values were key attributes of university life.  Today, this does not 
seem to be the case.  How people feel about their work, what they think 
about the changes taking place, and how such changes affect them, seems to 
hold a very low priority in the eyes of management (Coady, 2000).  To the 
contrary, the culture which is developing promotes and rewards 
unquestioning allegiance to management and obedience to ‘initiatives’ such 
as downsizing, outsourcing, and restructuring.  The concern with structure 
is paramount, while people are simply seen as economic units akin to 
pawns, to be used in a fashion which best suits the purpose of the 
management agenda.  People are stripped of their dignity, value, and 
significance, but then, such qualities are of little concern in a rationalistic 
world.   
 
If individuals are forced to work in a culture of intimidation and 
bureaucratic conformity, they feel disenfranchised, and their spirit begins to 
protect itself.  Individuals enter what Barnard termed long ago (1938) a 
‘‘zone of indifference’’, where interest plummets and accordingly, so does 
productivity.  The pleasure has gone out of work.  This tends to affect life in 
general and individuals suffer a type of institutionally-induced depression.  
Camus once made the comment that ‘‘without work, all life goes rotten, but 
when work is soulless, life stifles and dies’’ (in Kolb, 1995a, p. 547). 
 
Without necessarily being able to express their feelings, individuals begin to 
feel like Joseph K., in Franz Kafka’s (1925/1968) The Trial.  The following 
excerpt is illustrative of the feeling which is engendered by continually 
being subjected to a work environment which discounts people and which, 
prima facie, doesn’t seem to make any sense; 
 
The only sensible thing was to adapt oneself to existing conditions.  
Even if it were possible to alter a detail for the better here or there - 
but it was simple madness to think of it - any benefit arising from that 
would profit clients in the future only, while one’s own interests 
would be immeasurably injured by attracting the attention of the 
ever-vengeful officials.  Anything rather than that!  One must lie low, 
no matter how much it went against the grain, and try to understand 
that this great organisation remained, so to speak, in a state of 
delicate balance, and that if someone took it upon himself to alter the 
disposition of things around him, he ran the risk of losing his footing 
and falling to destruction, while the organisation would simply right 
itself by some compensating reaction in another part of its machinery 
- since everything interlocked - and remain unchanged, unless, 
indeed, which was very probable, it became still more rigid, more 
vigilant, severer, and more ruthless.     (pp. 131-132) 
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Kolb (1995a) makes the observation that ‘‘sociologists and psychologists tell 
us it is pain that makes people and living systems change.  But crisis 
management  - pain management - is a dangerous way to manage for 
change’’ (p. 42).  The epithet ‘‘no pain, no gain’’ is nonsense.  Change ought 
to be managed in ways other than tearing the heart and soul out of people. 
In a comprehensive study relating to what people saw as the most 
important qualities of a job, Yankelovich and Immerwahr (1983), found that 
the most important were: working with people who showed respect (88%); 
recognition of good work (84%); having the opportunity for creative 
thought and discretion rather then merely engaging in the execution of 
instructions (83%).  Those who fail to find satisfaction within the system are 
liable to become passive-aggressive in their behaviour.  Such a defence 
mechanism acts to protect the individual while at the same time punish the 
system.  Ultimately, if leaders are not perceived as leading in a caring 
fashion, desired change will is doomed to fail.  Leaders can affect an 
organisational culture, but they cannot unilaterally determine what that 
culture should be.  It is a mistake to think otherwise.  Culture in any social 
system emerges from a consensus of values held by the community as a 
whole (Trice & Beyer, 1993). 
 
 
‘Initiative’ Five:  Rhetoric rather than Reality 
 
The language of propaganda in an organisation is a powerful tool and the 
way in which it is used provides insight into the workings of a social system.  
Those who speak with perspicuity and honesty tend to be believed, whereas 
those who speak from behind a smokescreen of jargon and gobbledegook are 
perceived as having something to hide.  An investigation of a number of 
Australian university websites (search undertaken by the author December, 
2000), indicates an unprecedented trend toward the use of corporate jargon 
by university management (Table 3 ). 
 
 
Table 3 
Corporate Jargon used by University Management 
 
   
• outsourcing • client- centred • seamless education 
• downsizing • sessional staff • political correctness 
• interfacing • customer- focused • globalisation 
• corporatising • stakeholders • productivity gains 
• multi-skilling • products • reform agenda 
• reskilling • synergism • networking 
• reclassifying • career path • ..... the Red team 
• retooling • delivery systems • future-oriented 
• targeting • product orientation • market strategy 
• restructuring • human resources • market share 
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• realigning • resource focus • strategic alliance 
• reshaping • service culture •    marketplace philosophy 
• product packaging • mission statement • human resources 
• realignment • efficiency driven • productivity savings 
• reconfiguring • purpose statement • gender inequalities 
• strategic 
repositioning 
 
• designated functional 
areas 
•   management initiative 
 
 
Words such as those cited are often combined in a formulaic fashion.  The 
final product may be seen in the following examples found on various 
university websites.  A translation for the uninitiated, has been provided by 
the writer; 
 
• ‘‘Reshaping a career path to fit in with the reform agenda’’  
(= downgrading someone’s job); 
• ‘‘Strategically restructuring designated functional areas to ensure  
productivity gains’’  
(= fewer people doing more work); 
• ‘‘Targeting stakeholders to produce a strategic alliance’’  
(= getting more money or influence); 
• ‘‘Targeting gender inequalities to better reflect the marketplace 
philosophy’’  
(= getting rid of, or discriminating against, males). 
 
The following three examples which were found have no translation as their 
semantic import was too difficult to determine: 
 
• ‘‘The Director Corporate Liaison..... will help us to anticipate and 
nurture positive relationships with some key stakeholders, who 
have a public and political dimension, to enhance [the 
University’s] interests and reputation.’’ 
 
• Relating to a Planning Workshop for Divisional Staff: 
‘‘The group had an opportunity to explore [the University’s] 
corporate identity, consider how we can foster a service culture 
and break down the ‘‘silos’’ that inhibit administration 
performing at its best for the Institution.’’ 
 
• The Faculty will "create synergies through inter-disciplinary 
approaches and appropriate alliances and achieve efficiencies 
through consolidation." 
 
The philosopher Bryan Magee (1997) made the pertinent observation that 
for those who have nothing to say, ‘‘obscurity..... provides a smoke-screen 
from behind which they make their advances in the world’’ (p. 468).  A fair 
comment.  Why can people no longer ‘‘say what they mean and mean what 
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they say’’?  Perhaps it is because they have nothing of any value to 
contribute, or conversely, because they are too frightened, a la Kafka, to say 
something clearly for which they will later be held accountable.  Hiding 
behind the rhetoric of corp-speak is much easier than admitting that we live 
in a highly complex world which poses questions for which there are 
sometimes no glib rationalistically-motivated answers. 
 
 
‘Initiative’ Six:  Mascara rather than Meaning 
 
To the outside community, universities are still largely seen as the bastions 
of intellectual prowess, integrity, and learning.  Those who are inside the 
system, however, know better.  They realise that these institutions are 
showing signs of disorganisation and disintegration, that, in like fashion to 
the accusation levelled at the Pharisees by the Prophet of Galilee, they are 
like a sepulchre: beautiful on the outside but on the inside, full of dead 
men’s bones.  Those who engage the tools of rationalism to counter the 
problem are acting a bit like the passengers on the Titanic-  fussing over the 
placement of the deckchairs while the ship is approaching an iceberg.   
 
Today’s university is has far fewer tenured academics and more individuals 
employed on a sessional basis than ever before (Coady, 2000). Sadly, the  
remaining tenured academics, rather than being involved in scholarship, 
research, and the teaching program to the same degree as they were 
previously, now act as co-ordinators, administrators, managers, and 
inductors of an ever-changing pool of sessional staff.  Academic tasks have 
been replaced by administrative and managerial ones - people with PhDs 
are being used to organise those with BAs to do the teaching and thus by 
default, run the programs.  In this way, knowledge as the product of 
systematic accretion is becoming greatly devalued.  What is valued, is the 
saving made on staffing costs.  Given such a scenario, it becomes difficult to 
argue that the quality of university programs is not suffering.  Neither can it 
be argued that students are getting real value for their ever-increasing fees.  
Australia as a nation will never approximate the status of what a one past 
Prime Minister termed ‘‘the clever country’’ (see Maslen & Slattery 1994), if 
excessive rationalism continues to flourish in the country’s universities.  
 
All the glossy brochures and  attractively constructed websites fail to 
compensate for real substance - for disaffected staff, disgruntled students, 
and a system in chaos.  One wonders whether management really believes 
its own propaganda about how wonderful things are or whether, in the 
absence of any real solutions, it uses this sort of mascara as a way of hiding 
the bones of disintegration.  Apart from issuing never-ending publications, 
management has another way of addressing the problem - further enlarging 
the bureaucracy by creating new managerial positions such as protocol 
manager, facilities co-ordinator, risk manager, space manager, director of 
corporate liaison, and office of corporate review.   
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Kolb et al. (1995a) identify four stages in organisational growth - inception, 
high-growth, maturity, and decline.  Of the final stage they write: 
 
The fourth stage, Decline, is characterised by rigid, top-heavy, overly 
complex organisational structures.  Communication breakdowns are 
common.  There is often blind adherence to a ‘success formula’, 
regardless of environmental changes that make this formula obsolete.  
Decision making emphasises form [planning process] rather than 
substance [important results], and self-serving politics are the norm.
       (p. 357) 
 
Sadly, features of this final stage are recognisable in many of Australia’s 
once thriving universities, thus signalling their decline.  Universities are 
only as strong as the people who make up the fibre of their very existence.  
While management remains bent on pursuing a rationalist agenda with its 
form rather than substance, all the whitewashing in the world will never be 
able to hide the evidence of functional disintegration.  Sadly, although 
university managers seem to be oblivious to the obvious, not so private 
enterprise.  Large corporations are currently entering into discussions 
relating to the establishment of Corporate Training Centres aimed at 
bypassing the universities.  Chief among these is Microsoft with the 
development of  Microsoft Professional Certification.  Such qualifications 
concentrate on providing industry-specific training with guaranteed 
employment at the end of a course.  A time is coming, and not too far off, 
when universities will no longer be able to hide behind their status as the 
only available accredited service providers.  If things do not improve in the 
very near future, they may find themselves touting products that nobody 
wants. 
 
 
DOES HOPE REMAIN? 
 
Korten (1995) speaks of a world-wide ‘institutional systems failure’ (p. 11), 
declaring that ‘‘public-opinion polls reveal a growing sense of personal 
insecurity and loss of faith in major institutions..... confidence in our major 
institutions and their leaders has fallen so low as to put their legitimacy at 
risk’’ (pp. 22, 23).  Universities are not excluded from Korton’s subsequent 
diatribe.  And the reason for this perceived failure?  Korton concluded that 
the corporate model, based on rationalist assumptions, has discounted the 
individual in favour of the dollar, has courted profits instead of people.  
This situation may well be the final destination of the kind of rationalism 
which Aristotle would have never envisaged and which Plato would have 
totally abhored. 
 
With further reference to institutions of higher learning, Parker concluded 
that ‘‘Educational contexts are simply too rich to fall readily under the kind 
of universal laws which enable predictions to be employed to such useful 
effect in natural science, car manufacturing and pharmacy’’ (1997, p. 36). 
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Peter Karmel (2000), a long-standing luminary in the Australian tertiary 
education sector has sounded a simiular warning, stating that "in 
developing public policy for resourcing education, decisions need to be 
made, not on the basis of ideological predilections, but on an assessment of 
the consequences that flow from the decisions with all their efficiency and 
equity implications. Anything less than this risks the future of Australia as a 
just and equitable society based on democratic principles" (p. 9).  In the 
same article, he further insisted that efficiency alone can never be the sole 
criterion for determining educational provision in Australia. 
 
There is no doubt that universities have had to respond to the Zeitgeist in 
which they now find themselves.  This is not in question.  What is being 
considered is whether the paradigm of economic rationalism is the best one 
for meeting present as well as future challenges, within the university.  
External challenges such as public funding are difficult if not impossible to 
control, however, internal ones such as distribution of available resources 
are directly within the ambit of university managers.  The time seems well 
overdue for university administrators to critically evaluate the assumptions 
and values upon which the pervading ideology of economic rationalism is 
built.  
 
Numerous writers (e.g. Haynes, 1997; Korten 1995; Parker, 1997) have done 
just that.  When distilled, three major features of this ideological position 
become evident, namely that: 
• economic self-interest takes pre-eminence over any supposed common 
good; 
• free market distribution of wealth on the basis of entrepreneurial activity 
is to be applauded; 
• any intervention should be implemented through general impersonal 
rules. 
These assumptions squarely attack that which universities have 
traditionally coveted, namely, the pre-eminence of knowledge; the inherent 
value of education as social capital; and the community of scholars with its 
culture of collaboration.   
 
It may be illuminating at this juncture to once again refer to the work of 
Aristotle - the great rationalist but not purveyor of rationalism - for whom 
the distinction between ‘‘reason’’ and ‘‘character’’ was far from clear cut.  For 
like the ancient Greek philosophers in general, Aristotle equated reason  
with personal stability and happiness.  Under the Greek conception, reason 
necessarily included notions concerning personal integrity, virtue and 
morality.  In Book 6 of the Ethics, Aristotle (1953) wrote that there were 
‘‘Five modes of thought or states of mind by which truth is reached’’.  The 
first four of these he identified as: 
 
 1.   Science or scientific knowledge (episteme) 
 2.   Art or technical skill (techne) 
 3.   Prudence or practical judgement (phronesis) 
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 4.   Intuition (nous) 
 
The modern rationalistically-based university system, however, has evolved 
into a notoriously reductionistic one, reflecting the empirical and positivist 
base from which it has emerged throughout modernity.  Consequently, due 
attention has not been paid to Aristotle's fifth and most important mode - 
Wisdom (sophia).  Aristotle described this as ‘‘the most finished form of 
knowledge’’, defining it as the whole which emerges when scientific 
knowledge, art, prudence and intuition are combined.   
 
In similar vein, the great Danish philosopher, Søren Kierkegaard, discussed 
education in terms of "edification".  By "edification", he meant the 
"upbuilding" of personal virtue or wisdom.  For Kierkegaard (1947), the 
main question for education was always: What kind of person it is desirable 
to build?  This places "moral education" and ‘‘personal development’’, in 
their fullest senses, at the very heart of educational philosophy.  According 
to this view, the primary aim of education ought to be the development of 
persons of ‘‘character’’. 
 
But is all this merely a pining after the past?  The mythologizing of an era 
that never really was?  Reminiscing rather than restructuring for a new  
millenium?  Recent writings pertaining to human organisation indicate 
otherwise.  They chronicle a picture which suggests firstly, that the tenants 
of raw rationalism are bankrupt; and secondly, that unless deeper human 
values are considered, no rationally-driven system will ever endure, the 
university included.  Such writings appear to fall into three broad 
categories. 
First, those which  appeal to the great religions for guidance; second, those 
which see benefit in wisdom of philosophers of society; and finally, those 
which turn to the twentieth-century business world for illumination. 
 
The first school, which references itself against the great religions (usually 
seven are identified: Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism, Confusianism, 
Toaism, Buddhism, Islam), is exemplified in the writings of Scott (2000), 
who suggests that unlike the great religions of the world: 
 
most corporations, by contrast, have achieved a collective 
history of no more than 50 years.  Their level of collective 
understanding about their core constituents, their people, is 
infinitely less mature than that of the great religions.  They 
engage in formal market research to accelerate the process, but 
virtually none of this is aimed at understading themselves.  It 
is aimed at understanding their external customers.  The only 
systematic self-diagnosis most firms engage in is done by 
management consultantants.  This on the whole leads us back 
to the mechanistic approaches….. you can’t reengineer your 
soul! (p. 21). 
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Scott then presents ‘‘seven common qualities’’ in which the religions find 
agreement and which corporations must consider if they are to inspire 
adherence in people.  It is proposed that these qualities satisfy a deep 
psychological/spiritual need in individuals and revelove around: 
• a moral authority  
• collective interests rather than self-interest 
• a deeply ingrained ritual and symbolism 
• a well-understood tradition 
• a fundamentally optimistic outlook 
• the ‘big questions’ about life 
• mystical authority 
Such a list would be perceived as being fatally toxic to the purveyors of 
economic rationalism. 
 
The second group, which appeals to the distilled wisdom of the great 
philosphers of social organisation, is typified by the recent work of writers 
such as Das (1999) and Levin (2001).  This approach questions whether the 
application of scientific logic to the study of human affairs is philosphically 
defensible, that is, whether the assumptions of scientifically-based 
rationalism are sufficient for explaining human behaviour.  With reference 
to the employer-employee relationship, writers generally conclude that 
rather than the ‘scientific management’ espounsed in Taylorism, an 
inviolable ‘social contract’ ought to be the basis of all forms of industrial and 
human organisation.  It is their contention that social philosophy through 
the ages has clearly and successfully argued for the position that people 
must take precedunce over products, if the social fabric of community is to 
be prevented from freying.  Table 4 highlights the contributions of the most 
prominent philosophers in question.  As with the previous group, a perusal 
of this Table makes it immediately obvious that most of the ‘principles’ 
articulated here are anathema to the ‘ethic’ of rationalism. 
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Table 4 
Insights from philosophers of societal organisation 
[After Das (1999), p. 52] 
 
 
The third approach to human organisation is found in the writings of what 
may be called the ‘social rationalists’, that is, those who indeed see the value 
of a rational approach but insist that such an approach must be tempered by 
humanistic values.  Advocates of this position largely come from the world 
of business economics.  The values they espouse have been defined by 
different names, but their characteristic attributes are suprisingly similar, as 
can be seen by reference to Table 5.  There seems to be a heart here, a deeper 
spirit, a soul, which is lacking in the formula-driven, mechanistic 
approaches which have littered the landscape for the past quarter of a 
century.  Indeed, there appears to be a recognition of values which are 
inherent in the very nature of what it means to be human.  As one of their 
sympathizers insists ‘‘when you look at the world through an ideology you 
are finished.  No reality fits an ideology.  Life is beyond that’’ (De Mello, 
1990, p. 148). 
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Table 5 
Reported Characteristics of Effective Human Organisation 
 
 
KORTEN (1995, pp. 271-3) 
 
KOLB (1995a, p. 496) 
 
TOMASKO (1993) 
 
COVY (1990) 
[Principles for social helath 
in the 21st century] 
[7 Spiritual Values] [Architecture of 
corporate change] 
[Habits of highly 
effective people] 
 
 
   
• Economic jsutice • National service 
    through industry 
 
• Start from the  
      bottom up 
• Compassionate 
communication 
• People’s sovereignty • Fairness 
 
• Repeal work  
fragmentation 
• Fostering self-esteem 
• Intrinsic responsibility • Harmony & co-
operation 
 
• Structure 
horizontally 
• Engaging the 
emotions  
• Common heritage • Struggle for 
betterment 
 
• Organize around 
processes, not 
functions 
• Valuing difference  
 • Courtesy & 
humility 
 
• Make individuals 
count 
• Explaining  motives 
 • Adjustment & 
assimilation 
 
• Pyramids are for 
dead Egyptians! 
• Defining and 
pursuing strengths 
 
 
• Gratidude  • Developing an 
environment of trust 
 
 
 
The attributes espoused by the great religions, the philosophers of human 
organisation and the advocates of what I have called social rationalism, appear 
to have identified a common human longing in the workplace, and one which 
rationalism is incapable of satisfying.  Thinkers from all three camps insist that 
individuals will give their best when they feel they are engaged in worthwhile 
work; when they are respected, appreciated, and valued; and when they feel 
they are being heard.  Economic rationalism cannot meet such needs because 
its foundational values and assumptions are incapable of supporting them.  
Hence, as suggested earlier, it is these very values and assumptions which 
need to be reexamined.  For as Kolb (1995a) has argued, ‘‘change almost 
always requires examining and rethinking the assumptions people hold about 
the environment, the way the organisation functions, and their working 
relationship with other people’’ (p. 620).  Without such open and accountable 
examination, change for the better is unlikely to occur.  Indeed, the ‘Gentle 
Galilean’, may have been right when he said ‘‘where your treasure 
[assumption] is, there will your heart [value] be also’’ (Matt 6:21 NIV). 
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If it is true, as Pascal suggested, that ‘‘the heart has its reasons which reason 
knows not of’’, then administering a university like a corporation will 
severely damage its chief resource, its personnel, thereby endangering its 
very mission.  Pring (1999) wrote insightfully when he insisted that ‘‘human 
beings are not machines that can be worked harder with the only 
requirement being a regular service and lube.  Human beings require 
recognition, praise, and above all, a degree of care that machines do not 
need.  Human resource allocation is therefore not always rational’’ ….. 
the key question to human organisation is ‘how ought we to live?’ 
(translated in the workplace context into ‘How ought we to treat our 
staff?’)’’ (p. 33-4) 
 
What has been argued here echoes the words of Magee (1997), that it is now 
time to venture forth out ‘‘of the shallows of rationalistic humanism to an 
appreciation of the mystery of things’’ (p. 564).  Do we really want to fashion 
Australian universities along corporate lines when ‘‘corporations are free to 
act soley on the basis of profitability without regard to national or local 
consequences; relationship, both individual and coroprate, are defined entirely 
by the market; and there are no loyalties to place and community’’ (Korten, 
1995, p. 131)?  Universities must not become further degraded by continuing 
down the same path as rationalistically-motivated corporations.  Rather they 
must strive to reinvent themselves as institutions of higher learning, motivated 
by the imperatives of academic excellence, intellectual pride, a spirit of 
compassion, and principled decision-making.  Rather than following the pied 
piper of rationalism on what is fast becoming his terminal outing, Schaeffer 
(1975) may well have been correct when he suggested a quarter of a century 
ago that ‘‘man will have to renounce his rationalism, but then..... he has the 
possibility of recovering his rationality’’(p. 82).  Hope indeed remains! 
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